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Butas and Daivas as Justices in Tulu Nadu:  
Implications for the Philosophy of Law 
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Legal Diversity in India  
All over India there are peculiar examples of dispute resolution where 
the responsibility for justice is completely delegated to spirits such as 
butas or daivas, devtas or jinns. This paper will show that a spirit-
based justice system such as this is not necessarily tied to romantic 
and orientalising ideas of ancient society. When the paper compares a 
spirit-based justice system with a modern state-based legal system, it 
treats both as coeval.1  
The paper is thereby able to explore the implications of such a com-
parison for modern Political and Legal Philosophy. One of these 
implications is that it puts a question mark on the modern claim to an 
ethical neutrality of a law-based justice system. Both, the law-based 
justice system and the justice system based on the belief in spirits, are 
relying on a particular ethical background consensus–one spiritual, one 
secular. For the spirit-based system this poses no problem as long as 
lifeworlds continue to be enchanted and communicative action is not 
cut loose from ties of sacred authorities, or released from the bonds of 
archaic institutions.  
Moreover, the continued existence of spirit-based justice systems in 
much of the post-colonial world falsifies the modernist view that only 
small and relatively undifferentiated groups are able to integrate by 
regulating behaviour through archaic religious institutions like spirits. 
With the failure of modern law to make up for the legitimation crisis of 
liberal-democratic societies, postcolonial legality with its archaic insti-
tutions, "legal diversity"2, and paradigms of "porous legalities" (Liang 






























ceivable within the blinds of the modern episteme. These may not be 
able to displace the normalised paradigms of modern, secular law-
based regimes in practice, but they do shake up their resting position 
within liberal political theory.  
The literature on India’s alternative (legal) modernities (Kaviraj 
2000) abounds with examples of how communities or corporate groups 
settle their disputes outside the purview of the state and its courts. 
Although known and often maligned for such extremes as death sen-
tences or honour killings ordered by "Khap panchayats" (Kattumana 
2015) or "Devil’s courts" (Headley 2015), conflict resolution outside 
the paradigm of state-sponsored (positive, man-made) law relies on 
accepted ways of disciplining and punishing by village panchayats and 
slum dwellers associations, tribal assemblies and caste councils. All of 
these use force to a certain extent (not necessarily physical violence) 
and the debate is whether this is legitimate given the state’s claim to a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  
I will set aside this disturbing question and instead look at Indian 
examples of a widespread phenomenon: the self-regulation of commu-
nities by way of a spirit-based justice system. Although such a system 
could in the legal pluralism approach be described as a system of law, 
there are good methodological reasons not to do so. However, the 
spirit-based system and the law-based system reconnect on the level 
of principles of justice. On this level, the spirit-based system appears 
as an alternative to systems based purely on law, whether customary 
or statutory.  
After a few methodological considerations, I will argue that these 
spirits are efficacious institutions of justice. To argue thus, I claim that 
we can leave aside the question whether these spirits are 'real' in the 
objective sense. It suffices to show that their existence is an inter-
subjectively shared reality for the believers. Such beliefs, as part of the 
social imaginary, are efficacious just like any other social institution 
whose reality is grounded in the intersubjective "social world" rather 
than in the "objective world" of science or the "subjective world" of 
experience (Habermas 1985: 16).  
The paper compares the two systems―one spirit-based; one based 
on statutory law―on the level of ideal-types. I thereby avoid the asym-
metrical comparison of an ideal system on one hand with an opera-
tional system on the other (Baxi 1982: 346). When comparing both 
systems on the level of ideas, it is apparent that one of them suffers 






























The paradox afflicting the state-sponsored legal regime can only be 
resolved by resorting to the stipulation of a moral consensus, which is 
precisely what is said to be lacking under modern conditions. While a 
system based on state-sponsored law purports to be able to do without 
appeals to an integrated morality of its citizens, the spirit-based 
system is said to be less suited to modern conditions of plurality pre-
cisely because it rests on the assumption that everyone shares the 
same belief. One of the staple claims of modernist theories of law 
(such as Habermas’ 1996 theory) is that modern society cannot be 
integrated or stabilised based on spiritual beliefs that not everyone 
shares.  
While this may be true for Western societies, the claim seems less 
obvious in the case of societies like India where, in spite of their 
(different) modernity3, people continue to believe in the force of 
supernatural beings like spirits and deities. To the modernist, 
'premodern' societies (with the supposedly more uniform religious 
beliefs of their members) serve as examples of the allegedly lost unity 
of ancient times in which a self-standing conception of justice―inde-
pendent of any controversial religious or secular belief and only based 
on an "overlapping consensus" between conflicting religious and 
secular world views (Rawls 1999)―was not yet required. India was 
highly diverse even before modernity set in and thus it had developed 
mechanisms for interreligious conviviality even prior to any process of 
secularisation. Belief in spirits is one such mechanism. This paper will 
show that the belief in their efficaciousness as mediators of justice is 
shared by members of all religious denominations in spite of their 
internal differences.  
Some remarks on methodology 
Anthropologists have raised interesting methodological questions with 
regard to the study of spirits (Espirito Santo 2013; Goslinga 2013: 
Meyer 2016; Scott 2013). As Birgit Meyer remarks in the African 
context, with respect to the spirits populating the world of the Ewe in 
Ghana, "Spirits […] are not just there, as signs of a traditional past, 
but reproduced under modern conditions" (Meyer 2011: 88). This 
paper will show that in the Indian context, spirits appear and are 
reproduced under modern conditions, especially in judicial settings.  
Another methodological trap that has been exposed in much of 
postcolonial literature is stage theory of legal development. A 






























Between Facts and Norms (1996) presumes that societies, in a process 
of "rationalisation", graduate from tribal or lineage society to kingdom, 
empire, and early modern state, until they finally reach the level of the 
fully modern constitutional and democratic state. In terms of legal 
practices this entails a "learning process" beginning with a pre-modern 
magical or sacral understanding of social order and culminating in the 
realisation of positive, fully democratic constitutional law (Habermas 
1996: 137-44). As in other domains, and likewise in the domain of 
law, this view denies "coevalness" (Fabian 1983) to contemporaries 
who take spirits to exist in and behind the world of physical appea-
rance. It is as with modernity in Partha Chatterjee’s account:  
When it encounters an impediment [i.e. people believing in 
spirits], it thinks it has encountered another time […] something 
that belongs to the pre-modern. Such resistances to […] 
modernity are therefore understood as coming out of humanity’s 
past, something people should have left behind but somehow 
haven’t. (Chatterjee 2004: 5)  
This conception of modernity is a normative one, based on a mythical 
notion of "a time space of epic proportions" (Chatterjee 2011: 1), a 
fact which is in plain contradiction with the Enlightenment’s claim to 
help us emerge from our "self-induced immaturity" (Kant 1784: 481). 
The mythical time-space of the pre-modern serves only as a narrative 
device to throw into sharp relief the achievements of the moderns. 
"The curious fact is that the negatively designated historical past could 
even be found to coexist with the normatively constituted order of 
modern political life in a synchronous, if anomalous, time of the 
present" (Chatterjee 2011: 1). 
This paper seeks to avoid such modernist "nonsynchronism" (Un-
gleichzeitigkeit, Bloch 1977) and neglects the obligation to its dialect-
tics. And just as it refuses to relegate spirits and their believers to 
another age, it also refrains from relegating spirits to an ontological 
realm different from ours. Spirits, for their believers and for the 
purposes of this paper, do not inhabit a world other than ours, i.e. they 
are not relegated to a world of transcendence, but they share with us 
the very world we live in (Meyer 2011: 97). Some of the spirits, like 
our butas and daivas, even have a jurisdiction bound to a particular 
territory. The physical world and the spiritual world are on the same 
level. They are not perceived as belonging to two different ontological 
dimensions, one immanent, one transcendent. It is rather that their 






























sonators through special ritual performances (kola, nema, jagar) 
where the body of a medium gets possessed by a particular spirit.  
How does a spirit-based justice system work? 
The belief in spirits as administering justice is found across India and 
amongst diverse religious communities―Animist, Jain, Buddhist, 
Hindu, Christian, and Muslim. The Animistic belief system of Tulu 
Naḍu4 includes the spirits of wild animals such as the wild boar buta 
Panjurli (Brückner 1995: 113-4), the tiger buta Pili (ibid.: 201), the 
Gaur buta Maisandaya (ibid.: 201), the snake buta Naga Bemmeru 
(ibid.: 181-97); ferocious, bloodsucking spirits like Guḷiga and Cauṇdi 
(Upadhyaya 1996: 203); tragic human figures like Maindalu or 
'Mayndala' (Claus 1979: 42-5), the two warriors Koti and Chennaya 
(Claus 1978a: 7-9; 1978b: 35-7), the two hunters Kari and Kabila 
(Gowda 1986: 267), the Siri sisters and Kumar (Claus 1975, 1978a, 
1978b, 1979: 36-42), the stone mason Kalkuḍa and his sister Kallurṭi 
(Claus 1978b: 32-3), two shipwrecked Muslim traders Bobbariya 
(Brückner 1995: 32) and Ali buta (Hikosaka 1991: 566); royal figures 
or 'rajan daivas' like Jumadi (Brückner 1987), Dhumavati (Brückner & 
Poti 1992), Malaraya (Brückner & Rai 2015) and Balavaṇḍi (Ishii 2012; 
2013; 2015); and devas like Ullalthi (Suzuki 2008).  
Some work has been done on the Himalayan gods of justice such as 
Bhairav, Golu Devta, and Poku Devta (Fanger 1990; Malik 2009; 2015; 
Sax 2009; Sax & Basu 2015; Baindur 2015). A dissertation on the 
petitioning of jinns at Feroz Shah Kotla in Delhi has recently been 
completed at Columbia University (Taneja 2012; 2013a&b).5 Addi-
tionally, some remarks on the judicial aspects of the butas and daivas 
of coastal Karnataka can be found in multiple works (Carrin 1999; 
Carrin & Tambs-Lyche 2003; Claus 1973; 1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1986, 
1989; 1991; Brückner 1987; Ishii 2013; 2015; Someshwar 1986; 
Suzuki 2008). But no comprehensive work exists so far on the spirit-
based justice system of Tulu Nadu (Karnataka), not to speak of the 
institution of the dharmadhikari of Dharmasthala, even though his pre-
eminence was recognised even by the colonial state.  
In this paper, I would like to create an ideal-typical picture of how a 
spirit-based justice system could work, based on the literature and on 
field work carried out in this region while I was a guest faculty at the 
Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities (MCPH) between July 
2014 and May 2016. This will allow me to compare on a theoretical 






























sophy with a spirit-based justice system abstracted from the available 
anthropological evidence. The latter need not qualify as a "system", 
much less a "legal system", as there is hardly any explicit reference to 
(unwritten) legal norms coming from the field.  
The spirit-based justice system, of course, has to be seen in inter-
action with the state-sponsored legal system, which it sometimes 
mimics, sometimes shuns. Examples of the former are the written 
petitions, preferably on government stamp paper, used in Golu Devta’s 
temple in Chitai (Uttarakhand) (Baindur 2015) or in addressing the 
jinns of Feroz Shah Kotla in Delhi (Taneja 2012, 2013a&b). An 
example of the latter kind has emerged from our field work. Other 
legal anthropologists have found many more examples of non-state 
legal practices protecting their autonomy from state interference by 
compelling their members to stay away from state courts (some of 
them mentioned in Baxi 1982).  
There is reason to believe that in its present form the spirit-based 
justice system of Tulu Naḍu is a modern phenomenon. Its current 
importance may point to the dethronement of the landlords by the 
postcolonial state in the course of the land reforms of the 1970s 
(Carrin & Tambs-Lyche 2003: 5). Since the secular court system of the 
independent Indian state has taken over the judicial function of the 
landlords who formerly used to adjudicate borrowing their authority 
from the spirits (Claus 1973; 1975; 1978a&b; 1979; 1986; 1989; 
1991), it is now the spirits themselves who adjudicate. Thus, in a way, 
the existence of the modern Indian state amplifies the significance of 
the spirit-based justice system of Tulu Naḍu.  
Let us look at one particular case that was adjudicated by a daiva in 
Kasargod. This case is about the direct confrontation of the two justice 
systems, the spirit-based and the law-based. The paper uses evidence 
gathered on a field trip on the occasion of the spring fertility ritual 
(keddasa) of Kodlamogaru Village, Kasargod district, north Kerala, 
from 9-11 February 2016. The field trip was organised as part of a 
course in Legal Anthropology that I taught at MCPH in the Spring Term 
of 2016. Its participants included six MA students, two PhD students 
and one other colleague. Among them were several Kannada speakers, 
one Tulu speaker and one Malayalam speaker, the three principal lan-
guages spoken in the region. Interviews usually took place in groups 
consisting of several interviewees and several interviewers.  
The interview from which I will quote below was taken on 10 Febru-






























pambada (impersonator) Lakshman Yane Kantha and the patri (oracle) 
Shekhar. Asked if they remembered any judicial cases that butas had 
solved in the past couple of years, they came up with the following 
account.  
In May 2014, the Supreme Court of India had banned cockfighting 
under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. Traditionally cockfights 
take place at the occasion of kolas and nemas. In December 2014, the 
police raided the cock fight taking place at the occasion of the nema.  
Once during a nema a police team arrived and tried to stop the 
cock-fight. Angered by the police intervention the villagers hit the 
police. Some policemen got injured. The police called for rein-
forcements and arrested around twenty five members of the 
village. A case was filed against each of them and the matter 
went to the court. Meanwhile the villagers invoked the spirit of 
their daiva and pleaded to him that their action was a kind of 
reaction to the police’s unjust intervention into the realm of faith. 
The daiva promised the villagers to take care of the matter and to 
teach the police a lesson. Within some time one of the police offi-
cers who had arrested the villagers lost one of his arms and 
another lost one of his legs. Following this the police decided to 
settle the matter and withdraw the cases from court. As a mark of 
sin-cleansing the police department donated eight grams of gold 
to the shrine.  
Much can be inferred from this example regarding the legitimacy in the 
eyes of the people of the spirit-based justice regime as opposed to the 
state-sponsored juridical system. I have dealt with this elsewhere 
(Dusche 2016). Instead I would like to engage with the methodological 
question of how to make sense of the efficacy (Sax et al. 2010) of the 
spirit-based justice regime without having to subscribe to magical 
beliefs in the way of a "religious science" (Scott 2013). I would prefer 
to take an agnostic stance comparable to the one argued for by Birgit 
Meyer, i.e. one that suspends the belief in magic but does not fore-
close the possibility of the "wow" (Meyer 2016).  
Thus for methodological, and not for principled reasons, we rule out 
the possibility of magic done through supernatural beings, and there-
fore suspend our belief in the story that the daiva, at the instigation of 
the villagers, caused the two policemen to lose a hand and a leg 
respectively. The two policemen may have lost their limbs in accidents 
that were not in any way related to what they were doing to the villa-
gers of Kodlamogaru. Nevertheless, this paper will argue that we can 






























The rituals associated with spirit worship in Tulu Naḍu are far from 
empty. They are not, as the scientistic view would have it, lacking 
reason in regard to means-end relations (Habermas 1985: 15). The 
rites surrounding butas and daivas are also not merely "ends in them-
selves" (Quack 2010: 180), but follow a rationality of purpose, at least 
in the social dimension in which they are efficacious. I do not agree 
with Quack that "belief in causal consequences […] is a secondary 
quality of ritualized actions" (2010: 184), but I do agree with him that 
ritual efficacy "does not depend on whether or not the action is ritu-
alized" (2010: 183).  
Of course, given our methodological scepticism, there cannot be any 
direct causal link between a spirit and a severed limb. Thus imploring 
the daiva to 'teach the police a lesson' is a meaningless act if taken at 
face value. But there 'is' a relation between the 'belief' of the villagers 
in the daiva’s existence, the 'belief' of the policemen in the daiva as 
having caused the loss of their limbs, and the desired end result to 
'teach them a lesson'. The 'lesson' was effectively delivered, not in the 
way it is depicted in the story if taken at face value, but due to the fact 
that the 'beliefs' shared by villagers and policemen alike effectuate the 
desired response from the policemen, i.e. prisoners are released and 
the cases against them withdrawn, and the likelihood of the same 
policemen raiding any cock fight in the near future is considerably 
reduced.  
However, the success of the ritual activity of the villagers did not 
depend on the exact correspondence between their ritual actions and 
some ritual script. The success was already guaranteed in advance by 
the mere fact of the fear of the daiva shared by the villagers and the 
policemen. The performance of the ritual only helped participants to 
convince themselves again of his existence and power. If the police-
men hadn’t been staunch believers all along, they would not have 
causally attributed to the daiva the accidents that happened to them. 
Hence they would have had no reason to abide by the desire of the 
villagers to be left alone by the state, its law and its law enforcers. But 
since they were fellow believers, they accepted implication in what can 
only be described as a perversion of the course of justice (from the 
state legal perspective).  
Arguably, the efficacy of the spirit-based justice regime is not any 
more wonderful than the belief in any other social institution whose 
existence rests on nothing but the shared beliefs of its participants. 






























exists only for those who share the belief in its ability or right to exist, 
and its legal regime is efficacious only to the extent that people share 
a belief in its legitimacy and efficacy. And just as nobody can be forced 
to believe in the existence of a daiva, nobody can be forced to believe 
in the legitimacy of the state and its legal regime. The villagers of Tulu 
Naḍu and their policemen may not deny the existence of the state and 
its laws, but they have proved that they do not believe in its legitimacy 
when it comes to their way of life, of which the cock fights are a prime 
example.  
Perlocutionary efficacy of ritual performances 
There have been attempts to explain the efficacy of rituals in general, 
and of rituals pertaining to justice in particular, in terms of "perform-
ativity", a notion that is tied to the concept of the "illocutionary" and 
"perlocutionary force" attributed to utterances and performances. Thus 
Peter J. Claus refers to John L. Austin (1962) for an understanding of 
"how to do things with words", i.e. for an understanding of how 
language (in the broadest sense, which includes ritual performances) 
can be used not only to refer to things and states of affairs in the 
objective world, or "represent" them (Asad 1993: 78-9) but to bring 
about states of affairs in the social world. Here I am drawing on 
Piaget’s differentiation of three worlds that also underlies Habermas’ 
three-tier ontology, i.e. the objective (physical) world, the intersubjec-
tive (social) world, and the subjective (psychological) world (Habermas 
1985: 69-70).  
In our case, the believer’s illocutionary intention is directed at the 
daiva whereas the perlocutionary effects involve the police whom he is 
supposed 'to teach a lesson'. In the end the lesson is successfully 
delivered and the police bows to the spirit of justice. This perlocu-
tionary effect was intended, but not as a direct consequence of the 
speech act (or ritual performance) addressed to the daiva. At most, it 
was intended as an indirect consequence of this communicative act, 
mediated by the spirit.  
For the believer, this is a successful realisation of his illocutionary 
intention: he implored the daiva 'to teach them a lesson' and the daiva 
taught them a lesson. For us, however, with our suspended belief in 
the daiva, the consequences are to be analysed as unintended perlocu-
tionary effects coming about due to the coincidence of the beliefs in, 






























Thus in our analysis, an intended illocutionary consequence turns into 
an unintended perlocutionary consequence.  
Applied to our example this would yield the following analysis: When 
believers of the daiva call on him, or perform a ritual, with the illocu-
tionary intention to petition him to do something about their plight, the 
illocutionary intention of the performance may come to nothing (for us, 
because we have suspended our belief in butas and daivas). But the 
unintended perlocutionary effect may be a consequence that is equi-
valent or even identical to the intended illocutionary result. I shall call 
this form of efficacy "perlocutionary efficacy". Within our three-tier 
ontology, however, perlocutionary efficacy is restricted only to the 
social world.  
As perlocutionary efficacy is a common human experience, in all 
likelihood the very idea of magic is modelled on it. Just like the 
appropriate person can say 'hereby I declare you husband and wife' 
and thereby bring about the social fact of a marriage, the shaman 
wants to say 'hereby it rains' and it rains. By speaking the correct 
formula or by following a particular ritual in the right way, the perfor-
mance is believed to be efficacious in a manner similar to a speech 
act’s performative efficacy in the social world. The only difference with 
magic is that it attempts to be efficacious in the objective world. The 
idea of magic is incompatible with our methodological scepticism, but 
the concept of perlocutionary efficacy is not. There is nothing irrational 
therefore in attributing efficacious judicial powers to spirits in the social 
domain even when we ourselves may not believe in their existence in 
the physical domain. For them to really exist in the social domain it is 
sufficient that the members of that particular society 'believe' that they 
do.  
Perlocutionary efficacy is not only sustaining the justice system but 
the entire social order of the village. At every kola or nema the whole 
village is engaged in the preparation and the execution of the ritual. 
Nobody is a mere spectator. The performance revolves around the 
spirit, but the work for its preparation and execution itself is a 
performance with its own ritual efficacy. By engaging every caste and 
religious group of the village, including the Brahmins and the Muslims, 
it naturalises the social order of the village by making it tangible. In 
Kodlamogaru, all fourteen communities of the village have a particular 
role to play. By embodying those roles in their ritual activities, the 
villagers make those roles appear to be natural and necessary, thereby 






























drama called keddasa. They are performers and at the same time co-
authors of the great drama called keddasa. This would be irrational if 
this drama were fictitious. A fictitious character can’t also be a real 
author. But this is a real drama.  
Thus, the performance of a kola or nema can be called efficacious 
not only in the sense of maintaining justice. It is effective also in 
making tangible the moral and social order of the community and 
presenting again the collective memory of shared social and political 
history. In the case at hand this collective memory includes an account 
of how a Jain family that was ruling the area was ousted because they 
were not prepared to pay tribute to the daiva. Their sixteen children 
were blown into the Netravati River and killed, which led to the 
establishment of the present Bunt family in the Kodlamogaru House.6  
Can the spirit-based justice system be called a 'legal system'? 
Abstracting from this example and taking into account the several 
examples described in the literature, we are now in a position to 
generate an ideal-typical account of a society operating within a spirit-
based justice system. In such a society, humans have delegated 
disciplinary powers to spirits. In the event of an offence, the plaintiff 
demands redress from the accused. If the accused does not respond, 
the plaintiff publicly warns him that he will take the matter to the spirit 
of justice. If the accused still does not respond, the plaintiff will file a 
petition with the spirit. Now the accused knows that if s/he is rightfully 
accused s/he will have to face the wrath of the spirit. If some 
misfortune happens to her/him or to one of her/his kin, s/he will 
attribute it to the spirit’s doing. Eventually the rightfully accused will 
repay her/his debt to the plaintiff. Occasionally the perpetrator will 
have to publicly acknowledge her/his wrongdoing by sponsoring a 
ritual in which s/he apologises before the spirit and/or the whole 
community.7 In each case, the accused is brought to reason because 
s/he shares the belief in the spirit, which is known to be capable of 
inflicting great harm to her/him and to her/his family. In case the 
complaint proves to be false, the wrath of the spirit will be upon the 
plaintiff.  
Looking at the swords (kaḍtale) of the butas of Tulu Nadu, one is 
reminded of the Christian doctrine of the two swords of justice. In the 
case of a transcendental religion like Christianity, the divine sword will 
be applied only in a time transcending our times. In the meantime, 






























case of the butas of Tuḷu Naḍu, matters stand slightly differently. Since 
spirits share time and space with mortals divine justice does not have 
to wait for a time after times. It can be executed in this very day and 
age. Hence there is no need for worldly powers to wield the temporal 
sword in lieu of the heavenly sword of eternal justice. They can com-
pletely leave matters to the spirits. But can this be described as a legal 
system at all? I would argue that it could but, for methodological 
reasons, that it should not.  
According to H. L. A. Hart (1961), a "legal system" arises the 
moment a system based on "primary rules of obligation" is supplemen-
ted by "secondary rules". The secondary rules "specify the ways in 
which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, 
eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively deter-
mined" (Hart 1961: 94-5). In other words, they circumscribe and insti-
tutionalise what Max Weber (1968: 34) had called the "staff" of people 
entrusted with the administration of justice.  
Hart’s secondary rules are of four types. We need evidence of at 
least one type of rules for our spirit-based justice system to count as a 
legal system.  
(1)  rules of recognition,  
(2)  rules of change,  
(3)  rules of adjudication, and  
(4)  rules empowering individuals or institutions to carry out    
tasks (1)-(3). 
In the case of our ideal-typical society with the spirit-based justice 
system, (1) is definitively missing, i.e. there is no code of law and no 
authority positively determining what should count as law. (2) is also 
missing. Nevertheless this society is not "static", but subject to the 
kind of change that Hart described as "slow process of growth" (Hart 
1961: 92). Our society can be said to have a "legal order" only by 
virtue of (3) and (4), i.e. it authorises a specific social institution (a 
spirit embodied in a mortal) to determine whether (and which) law has 
been broken and to administer justice. It can therefore be affirmed 
that a system based on spirits as justices could be called a legal 
system.  
For methodological reasons, I would still prefer not to call the spirit-
based justice system a legal system. Agreeing with Fabian that 
"ethnography loses objectivity to the extent that it counteracts 






























prevail over a discursive, interpretive stance" (1979: 1), we should not 
allow a legal discourse to prevail over a justice discourse when it is not 
warranted by the communicative exchange with the research subjects. 
At least in our experience, references to law are not coming from the 
field, but would have to be superimposed. While I have no doubt that 
the intuitive sense of justice shared by spirit impersonator and 
villagers could be reconstructed in terms of a system of (legal) norms, 
I abstain from it since explicit reference to (legal) norms is hardly ever 
forthcoming from the participants of the ritual. While in the state-
based system the idea is to achieve justice via the mediation of law, 
the spirit-based system attempts to achieve justice by incorporating 
principles of justice into the setup of the ritual. I prefer, therefore, to 
speak of a 'justice system' rather than a 'legal system'.  
Theories of justice attempt to stimulate our sense of justice by way 
of thought experiments. Famous examples are the 'state of nature', 
the 'categorical imperative', the 'original position', or the 'ideal dis-
course situation'. The spirit-based justice system employs a similar 
strategy by incorporating principles of justice into the ritual practice 
itself. While philosophical thought experiments attempt to put the 
reflecting subject into the position of the least advantaged as a yard-
stick against which to measure one’s intuitions about justice8, the 
practice of the kolas and nemas is to actually have those in the least 
favoured position adjudicate. After all, the Pambadas and Nalikes of 
Tulu Nadu represent communities at the bottom of the social scale. It 
is through their mouth that the spirit pronounces justice. While a lot of 
ink has been spilled to attempt to show that the impersonator’s 
judgements could not possibly be independent of the powerful who 
hire them for their nemas, it remains true that their credibility within 
an entire community rests on the maintenance of a degree of indepen-
dence so that a "veiled criticism" of those in power is possible, and 
even very likely: "[The impersonator] must speak like a 'bhuta', not 
like a partisan to human conflict" (Carrin & Tambs-Lyche 2003: 30, 
italics in the original). This was confirmed by our field work.  
Implications for the Philosophy of Law 
The 'court case' that emerged from our field work is an example of the 
resistance put up by traditional communities against the intrusion of 
the state-based legal system. One way to look at it is to take it as 
proof for a resilient lifeworld that resists attempts at colonisation by 






























still retain an astounding capacity for self-organisation outside the 
paradigm of state and state-administered law. Therefore, non-state 
practices should not be dismissed out of hand as things to be 
overcome by an uncritically idealised modernity, but something to be 
engaged with at a par with the practices of the modern state.  
However, in this paper I am not comparing spirit-based and law-
based practices at the operative level. Instead I am comparing the 
ideal-typical spirit-based model with the ideal-theoretical model of the 
constitutional democratic state as presented by theorists like John 
Rawls (1995, 1997, 1999) and Jürgen Habermas (1985, 1988, 1996). 
For both thinkers, the original reason for having a state-administered 
and democratically legitimised law is the historical fact of the break-
down of the sacral-moral background consensus that supported the 
social order prior to the age of reformation. This would also be their 
argument against the viability of the ideal-typical example of a spirit-
based justice system in an allegedly secularising world. However, both 
these theses do not apply to much of the post-colonial world, espe-
cially India. For one, India never experienced a breakdown of its 
sacral-moral order comparable to the turmoil of the religious wars in 
early modern Europe. Secondly, the secularisation thesis as promul-
gated by the fathers of modern sociology has proved fallacious in most 
of the world outside Europe, which continues to be staunchly religious 
in spite of its (different) modernity (Casanova 1994).  
In Europe, after the breakdown of the medieval Christian order in 
the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in 
the Enlightenment period that followed, the idea of Christian natural 
law was slowly replaced by so-called 'rational' natural law. 'Reason' 
allegedly took the place previously occupied by the sacral-moral order, 
which conversely comes to be seen as insufficiently reasonable. Liberal 
contract theories opened the space for a new idea of the social based 
on 'rational' state craft and individual liberty. In fact, the two levels, 
state law and individual liberty, unhinged the sacral-moral order on 
which the social life of traditional communities rested. Self-governing 
"moral communities" (Thompson 1991) had to give way to a state-
sponsored "ethically neutralised domain" (Habermas 1996: 225) where 
individuals were encouraged to pursue their 'rational' advantage, 
limited only by the idea that the freedom of one should not impinge 
upon the freedom of another. Modern law thereby created a morally 






























Thus goes the 'rationalisation'-thesis underlying the conception of 
modern law from Weber to Habermas. It obviously does not apply to 
India, but does it even apply to Europe? Or does it turn out to be a 
convenient self-mystification of a process that lures the individual out 
of his/her protective communitarian shelter with the promise of unlimi-
ted gains in material and goods and liberties? The confrontation with 
the ideal-typical example of a spirit-based justice system, widespread 
as it is in post-colonial countries like India, helps us to step out of the 
eschatological enthralment of the liberal-democratic philosophy of law 
and gain a more sober perspective on what is going on.  
According to the liberal-democratic lore, individuals are to be 
conceived as freed from moral concerns, only pursuing their rational 
advantage. On the other hand they are conceived as committing 
themselves to contractual obligations.10 However, the ethics of pacta 
sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), ironically a clause stemm-
ing from Roman canonical (Church) law, would be without moral base 
in the morally neutralised sphere of the capitalist market if it weren’t 
for a moral background consensus off which the capitalist market con-
stantly lives without being able to sustain it. And not only does the 
capitalist market fail to sustain the moral background consensus that is 
constitutive of its own modus operandi (contract law), it constantly 
undermines it with the false promise of unlimited gains, 'freed' of 
social and environmental burdens.  
This paradox also applies to the ideology of the citizen in the liberal-
democratic state, which is based on another kind of contract, the 
contract between citizens (social contract) and the contract between 
the citizen and the state (political contract) whose sovereignty, accord-
ing to the liberal-democratic lore, rests on the citizenry taken together. 
On one hand, this state grants the greatest possible private autonomy 
to the individual citizen as is compatible with an equal degree of 
autonomy for all. Within this liberal space, individuals can chose their 
way of life, their religion and ethics. On the other hand the same state, 
because it is democratic, is not sustainable if every individual retires 
into private life. It depends on individuals embracing a civic ethos 
where they set aside their selfish interests and collectively work for the 
common good. This civic ethos is, however, constantly undermined by 
the very idea of the private person to which every other person 
becomes a hostile intruder into a self-referentially defined sphere of 
liberty. The rights-bearing private person, cut loose from all communal 
ties, therefore becomes all the more dependent on the state with 






























idea that at the same time he should coalesce with all others in order 
to collectively set limits to that state and to determine its laws and 
policies creates a well-known tension in the liberal-democratic frame-
work.  
According to liberal-democratic legal philosophy, law can only take 
care of coercible behaviour. It cannot demand or enforce a moral 
attitude. This moral attitude is necessary, however, for law to perform 
its integrative function as an expression of democratic self-rule of and 
by a people. Habermas (1996) tries to mend this problem by attribut-
ing a dual character to democratically engendered legal norms. They 
are legal norms to the extent that they are enforceable; they are 
attributed a moral character by Habermas to the extent that the 
process that engenders them requires the moral commitment of the 
citizen to the common good and to the moral community of all citizens 
in the state (ibid.: 29). While democratically legitimate law, according 
to Habermas, is not based on moral principles, it does depend on 
morally justified procedures guaranteeing a fair outcome: 
For without religious or metaphysical support, the coercive law 
tailored for the self-interested use of individual rights can 
preserve its socially integrating force only insofar as the address-
ees of legal norms may at the same time understand themselves, 
taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those norms. (ibid.: 
33)  
With the increasing distance of the average citizen from any semblance 
of collective rule-making, norm-setting, or law-making, and with the 
increasing diffusion of democratic sovereignty in non-transparent glo-
bal public-private networks of power, the hope that Habermas pins on 
popular sovereignty as a moral basis for the liberal-democratic state 
seems hopelessly misplaced. The idea of popular sovereignty no longer 
can, if it ever could, play the role of an anchor of a moral community 
of citizens since most of the laws and policies by which these citizens 
have to live today are generated in democratically not legitimised 
supranational institutions and elite networks. Thus, modern law lives 
off solidarity concentrated in the value orientations of citizens which 
again it cannot reproduce by itself. Not only does modern law fail to 
sustain the moral background consensus that is constitutive of its own 
modus operandi (civic ethos), it constantly undermines it with the 
unsustainable promise of unlimited gains in private 'autonomy'.  
It seems thus that the stabilisation of a liberal democratic society is 






























life under [sufficiently] just institutions" (ibid.: 58). Even the modern 
legal discourse, therefore, remains embedded in a larger moral 
discourse from which it receives what it cannot engender. However, 
the solidarity issuing from a communitarian lifeworld that capitalism 
and the modern state constantly undermine through their emphasis on 
private autonomy remains unacknowledged by theories of rational 
choice. Instead, a "sense of justice" (Rawls 1999) must be presup-
posed to have developed, which carries the burden of stabilising a 
society of egoists. Thus the idea that modernity could do away with 
the morally integrated world of pre-modern times, where moral, 
spiritual and legal notions were amalgamated to the point of indistin-
guishability, turns out to be just another self-mystification. In reality, 
modernity undoes one moral world ("moral economy", Thompson 
1991) of small scale communities, only to re-create another one on a 
national plain, and again only to undo this one too, without, however, 
this time helping to create another one on a global level.  
Under these circumstances, the idea of popular sovereignty and co-
authorship of legal norms upheld by Habermas (1988) only helps to 
obscure the continuing "legitimation crisis" of the modern state under 
conditions of a globalised neo-liberal economy which has reduced the 
scope of democratic politics to that of a 'market-compliant democracy'. 
And since the modern state in Europe by its very efficiency has erased 
any remnants of self-governing communities, there is no option out-
side the purview of the state to fall back upon. In much of the post-
colonial world, however, such communities do exist, and in abundance.  
We should not make the mistake of thinking that these are all 'pre-
modern' village communities. In India for example up to seventy 
percent of urban populations live under conditions which would have to 
be termed 'illegal' if seen from the state-legal perspective. More than 
seventy percent of housing is constructed 'illegally', seventy percent of 
the software used in India is 'illegal', and around seventy percent of 
the labour market is organised outside the law (Liang 2005: 6).11 The 
National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector in their 
2007 Report on the Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in 
the Unorganised Sector states that the universe of informal workers 
constitutes 93 percent of the total workforce.12 
It seems therefore that the greatest part of the Indian economy 
thrives outside the law. It is doubtful to what extent it benefits from 
the assistance of existing state-legal institutions or policies. More often 






























partners to secure informal, but binding agreements based on commu-
nicative action alone, enforced, if need be, by 'illegal' means. This 
clearly falsifies Habermas’ thesis that "modern economic societies" can 
only be integrated with the help of "positive law" (Habermas 1996: 25) 
but it reinforces his emphasis on the lifeworld as a guarantor of a 
moral background consensus without which, as we have seen, even 
the modern state and its law could not function.  
India’s traditional, and simultaneously modern, life-worlds are self-
governed, of course, in a way that cannot always be called democratic. 
But "[e]very social interaction that comes about without the exercise 
of manifest violence can be understood as a solution to the problem of 
[coordinating human action]" as Habermas rightly says (1996: 17). 
The prima facie legitimacy of such interactions, provided they do not 
rest on manifest violence, cannot, therefore, be dismissed out of hand. 
They are self-determining at least in the sense that they have not been 
tempered with by an extraneous authoritarian force like the state, and 
where this force has to be dealt with, it is engaged with, re-negotiated 
and rendered porous by what appears as illegality from a state-centric 
perspective. The state and its law is thereby re-liquefied and re-
absorbed into the lava of the lifeworld from which it once emerged to 
"organisationally outflank" (Mann 1986 vol. I: 7) the people.  
Conclusion 
We have seen how a spirit-based justice system ideal-typically works. 
We have ascertained that it could legitimately be called a legal system, 
but opted for calling it a justice system. We have compared it on the 
level of ideal-types with a system of state-sponsored law. And we have 
found that it is relying on a moral background consensus just like the 
state-sponsored legal system; the only difference is that the back-
ground consensus supporting the spirit-based system is spiritual, 
whereas the background consensus supporting the state-sponsored 
system is secular. This poses no problem as long as lifeworlds continue 
to be "enchanted" and "communicative action" is not "cut loose from 
ties of sacred authorities and released from the bonds of archaic insti-
tutions," as Habermas (1996: 26) put it. However, as we have seen, 
Habermas would be mistaken in assuming that those lifeworlds are 
therefore not coeval, that they would be less modern, or less internally 
differentiated or plural (ibid.). Our ideal-typical scenario does not 
"overtax the integrating capacity of communicative action", even if we 






























view, only "small and relatively undifferentiated groups" are able to 
integrate by regulating behaviour "through strong archaic institutions" 
(ibid.: 25). Our scenario clearly falsifies this view.  
The spirit-based system may rely on archaic institutions like spirits, 
but it is therefore not small and undifferentiated. And as we have seen, 
even a state-based justice system presupposes a shared moral back-
ground understanding as a precondition for its citizens to be able to 
engage in contracts and to support the civic ethos that is required for 
its democratic laws to be more than the expression of a modus vivendi 
between differently powerful private interests. How modern society is 
achieving this when it cannot rely on an overtaxed communicative 
action system is at least as mysterious as the juridical efficacy of 
spirits. Thus we can reply to the objection that spirits do not exist by 
questioning the existence of the civic ethos that is required for the 
state-based justice system to exist.  
With the failure of liberal-democratic law to make up for the 
legitimation crisis of neo-liberal-democratic societies, we should 
consider dropping this paradigm altogether and instead look at "post-
colonial legality" (Baxi 2000) with its legal diversity and paradigms of 
"porous law". They may offer "avenues of participation" (Liang 2005; 
Haritas 2015) previously not conceivable in Western contexts and 
within the blinds of the modern episteme. Even though legal diversity 
and porous legalities may be the paradigms followed in much of the 
postcolonial world, they may not be able to displace the normalised 
paradigms of Western legal regimes in practice. But as far as the 
philosophy of law is concerned, the stable location of positive law―as 
part of modern political theory―is shaken under the impact of 
previously existing alternative legal modernities in most of the world. 
Endnotes 
 
1 For helpful comments on the first draft of this paper I wish to thank Brigit Meyer as well as the 
participants of my conference on Non-State legal practices in India, 5-7 December 2015 in 
Manipal. For inspiring conversations on the topic I am grateful to Meera Baindur, Marine Carrin 
and Harald Tambs-Lyche. Thanks to Professor Parinitha Shetty and her mother, Ms. Punja, for 
inviting us to their manor house in Kodlamogaru. Thanks also to the students of MCPH who 
participated in my course in Legal Anthropology and who collaborated in this research.  
2 'Diversity' or 'plurality' is to be distinguished from 'pluralism'; "while Plurality is an ineliminable 
and elementary social fact, pluralism is a matter of belief and construct" (Baxi 2015: 1). In the 
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